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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
petents. A system of limited licenses given by the bar under supervision
of the courts could insure that only qualified non-lawyer specialists would
be permitted to exercise limited lawyer-type functions in a particular field.
Such a system would have a two-fold advantage. It would remove any
doubt in the public mind as to which specialists are qualified to give ad-
vice on matters having a heavy legal content. It would also protect the
individual specialist from the uncertain prospect of court action.
While neither the McCahan nor the Battelle case raises the prospect
of an immediate attack on professional non-lawyer specialists, such as
certified public accountants in the tax field, for the unauthorized practice
of law, an ounce of intelligent prevention would certainly be worth more




Probably one of the least to be expected and certainly one of the least
to be desired effects of the progress of medicine and surgery in the past
fifty years is the increase in actions for malpractice. A public which has
come to expect science and medicine to find a cure for everything is in-
creasingly willing to blame the individual practitioner for something
when the cure is not forthcoming. The increase in actions for malprac-
tice has already caused nationwide comment.
Malpractice has always been a disfavored action' and it carries with
it the short statute of limitations which usually attaches to such actions.2
Efforts to escape the stringency of this short limitation usually fail.'
In Corpman v. Boyer4 the husband of the victim of the alleged mal-
practice by the defendant-surgeon brought an action for damages for med-
ical expenses, loss of consortium and loss of services of his wife. It was
filed almost three years after the date upon which any action could have
accrued, and the sole question for the supreme court was whether the one-
year5 or the four-year catch-all tort section applied.'
The supreme court held that the action was not one for malpractice.
1. Note, 9 WEsT. RES. L. REv. 86 (1957).
2. OHIO REv. CODE § 2305.11.
3. See Swankowski v. Diethelm, 129 N.E.2d 182 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953).
4. 171 Ohio St. 233, 169 N.E.2d 14 (1960). See also discussion in Torts section, p. 566
inira.
5. OHIO REV. CODE 5 2305.11.
6. OHio REV. CODE 5 2305.09(D).
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The four judges in the majority relied heavily upon Kraut v. Cleveland
Raiwayi in which the husband's action (not in malpractice) for loss of
services and medical expenses arising out of injuries to his wife had been
held to be governed by the four-year statute rather than by the two-year
statute' governing "bodily injuries." In neither Kraut nor Corpman was
the action one for "bodily injury" or for "malpractice." It was apparently
"an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising on contract nor [other-
wise] enumerated."
There is a vigorous and cogent dissent by Judges Zimmerman, Taft
and Herbert, who point out that if plaintiff is going to succeed, he is going
to have to prove an act of malpractice against the defendant doctor. This
being so, he is by the decision of the majority being given three more
years than his wife to sue for what is essentially the same wrongful act,
even though an admittedly different legal right has been invaded.
In reaching their decision the majority also relied upon a case decided
earlier in the period covered by this survey, while the dissenters were
able to their satisfaction to distinguish it. In Klema v. Saint Elizabeth's
Hospital9 the court had decided that where the alleged negligent act of
a hospital results in -death, the two-year wrongful death limitation,"0
rather than the limitation of the malpractice statute applicable to the
decedent, had he lived, applies. The basis of the unanimous court's ac-
tion in Klema was the decision that the wrongful death gave rise to a new
and entirely separate cause of action in the personal representative of
decedent; for the majority in Corpman the same can be said of the hus-
band's action for loss of his wife's services and consortium. For the dis-
sent in Corpman, malpractice is not, as is wrongful death, separate from
the results to the husband of the victim of that act.
Further Cases On Limitations
Palmieri v. Ahart" involved the problem of the "borrowing stat-
ute, 's12 by which it is provided that if the laws of the jurisdiction where-
in a cause of action arose provide a shorter statute of limitations than does
Ohio, the foreign statute shall control when the action is brought in this
state. The question for decision was when the foreign statute began to
run.
7. 132 Ohio St. 125, 5 NE.2d 324 (1936). See also discussion in Torts section, p. 566
infra.
8. OMo REV. CODE § 2305.10.
9. 170 Ohio St. 519, 166 NXE.2d 765 (1960). See also discussion in Torts section, p. 566
infra.
10. OHio REv. CODE § 2125.02.
11. 111 Ohio App. 195, 167 N.T_2d 353 (1960). See also discussion in Conflict of Laws
section, p. 467 infra.
12. Omio REv. CODE § 2305.20.
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Plaintiff was injured by defendant in an automobile accident in West
Virginia on February 2, 1958. On October 4, 1958, defendant moved
from West Virginia to Ohio. The West Virginia statute of limitations
on plaintiff's action ran out on February 2, 1959. Plaintiff commenced
an action against defendant, now an Ohio resident, on March 6, 1959.
This was within the Ohio statute.'3
It was conceded that defendant's move from West Virginia to Ohio
was in good faith, but that even if it had not been so motivated, the de-
cision must be the same, since borrowing statutes "have been universally
construed not to include the borrowing of any of the tolling provisions."' 4
The court held that the West Virginia statute of limitations applied, that
the statute commenced to run when the cause of action accrued there and
that the action was barred in Ohio.
The decision also involved the companion case brought by the hus-
band of the injured woman, against the same defendant, for loss of his
wife's services, just as in Corpman, previously discussed. But since West
Virginia's statute of limitations for bringing actions for loss of services
was, at the time of the accident, also one year, the decision was the same
as to the husband's cause of action. The Ohio statute borrowed the West
Virginia statute as to both, and both were therefore barred.
Failure Otherwise Than On the Merits
Relief from the stringent consequences of the running of the statute
of limitations may be obtained in several ways. Of course, the best way
is for the plaintiff to commence his action before the statute has run. Oc-
casionally he does so, only to find that for some reason he has miscalcu-
lated in his action. Ohio has a statutory provision, section 2305.19,
which affords to a plaintiff an extra year if, having commenced or at-
tempted to commence his action within the period provided for it, he fails
"otherwise than upon the merits." The question then becomes what is a
failure "otherwise than upon the merits"?
In Cero Realty Corporation v. American Manufacturers Mutual In-
surance Company"s plaintiff had brought an action against four insurance
companies upon policies issued to it by them. It did so within the time
provided by the applicable statute of limitations. To this petition and to
an amended petition specific demurrers for misjoinder of parties defend-
ant were sustained by the trial court. The amended petition was dis-
missed by plaintiff without prejudice. Within one year from the date
of dismissal of the amended petition the plaintiff filed four separate pet-
13. OHIo REv. CODE § 2305.10.
14. Palmieri v. Ahart, 111 Ohio App. 195, 198, 167 N.E.2d 353, 355 (1960).
15. 171 Ohio St. 82, 167 N.E.2d 774 (1960).
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tions, one against each insurer, to which each defendant interposed by
specific demurrer the objection of the statute of limitations.
The plaintiff claimed the benefit of the saving statute. The issue
was whether a voluntary dismissal without prejudice by the plaintiff,
without having reached the merits, is a failure otherwise than upon the
merits.
The key in Ohio has long been language in Siegfried v,. New York,
Lake Erie & Western Railroad," in which it is said: "A dismissal by the
plaintiff involves no action of the court. It is a voluntary withdrawal
of his case, and is not a failure in the action."' 7 It has been followed or
cited with approval by several subsequent decisions of the supreme
court.
1 8
A more recent trend, however, has been to give section 2305.19 a
liberal construction in order to accomplish its remedial purpose. In pur-
suance of this end, the supreme court was able to distinguish Siegfried and
Buehrer v. Provident Mutual Life Insurance Company, 9 on the basis that
in neither of them was the dismissal by the plaintiff attributable to any
adverse decision by the court; on the contrary, the plaintiff had volun-
tarily dismissed his action. But, it is submitted, the real key to the su-
preme court's reasoning lies in its quotation from an annotation 0 in
which the distinction between voluntary and involuntary nonsuits is said
to be not well made: "such a construction of the statute is too narrow,
and voluntary as well as involuntary nonsuits are within its beneficent
operation.""
In all probability Siegfried has been overruled, insofar as it attempts
to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary nonsuits. Future dis-
tinctions will probably turn upon whether the merits have been reached.
On the other hand, this saving statute cannot be used unless an action
has been "commenced" within the full meaning of that term. To deter-
mine this, reference must be had to the section of the Code which pro-
vides that an action is commenced as to each defendant at the date of the
summons which is served on him.a
If a defendant is a minor certain other requirements exist, to wit:
16. 50 Ohio St. 294, 34 N.E. 331 (1893).
17. Id. at 297, 34 N.E. at 332.
18. Moherman v. Nickels, 140 Ohio St. 450, 457, 45 NE.2d 405, 409 (1942); Buehrer v.
Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 123 Ohio St. 264, 272, 175 NE. 25, 28 (1931); Welsh v.
Pennsylvania Co., 53 Ohio St. 670, 44 N.E. 1150 (1895).
19. 123 Ohio St. 264, 175 N.E. 25 (1931).
20. 86 A.LR. 1048 (1948).
21. Id. at 1051; Cero Realty Corp. v. American Mvffrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 171 Ohio St. 82, 86, 167
N.E.2d 774, 777 (1960).
22. Omo REv. CODE § 2305.17.
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service on him and his father, guardian or other person named in the
statute.
23
In Juhasz v. CorsonF4 plaintiff sued a minor and his father as joint
defendants in a tort action. Plaintiff did not know of the one defendant's
minority and did not serve the father as such. Defendants filed a joint
answer but did not raise the issue of minority or want of proper service.
Subsequent to the running of the statute of limitations plaintiff learned
of the true state of affairs, filed an amended petition and obtained proper
service on the defendant minor. Defendant minor filed a motion to
dismiss.
The supreme court ruled that plaintiff had not even "commenced"
the action against the infant defendant, since there was no valid or ef-
fective summons made on him within the two-year period. Therefore
there was no "failure" of any action which had been commenced. The
same result was reached in the case of Webb v. Chandler by a court of
appeals.2"
THE LURE OF LABELS
Three reported decisions appeared during the period covered by this
survey which illustrate, to this writer at least, the attraction which easy
labels have for lawyers and the dangers which may lurk in their use.
Morgenstern v. Austin26 involved an action wherein plaintiff owned
a brick warehouse. Defendant owned the contiguous property, upon
which were located a dwelling house and shed. Plaintiff alleged that
defendant had constructed the shed in violation of the ordinances of the
City of Cleveland and in such close proximity to plaintiff's building
that children could, and did, crawl from defendant's shed to plaintiff's
building, causing damage to it.
Plaintiff conceived the theory of her case against defendant to lie
in the area of attractive nuisance, and used both that phrase and other
words appropriate thereto in her petition. So far as appears from the
per curiam opinion, plaintiff proved substantially the facts she alleged
in her petition. Defendant's motion for judgment at the end of all the
evidence was overruled by the trial court and judgment was entered for
plaintiff.
The supreme court reversed and entered final judgment for defend-
ant. The course of reasoning whereby it did so is what is of importance
to pleaders.
First of all, said the court, the doctrine of attractive nuisance has
23. OHIO REV. CODE § 2703.13.
24. 171 Ohio St. 218, 168 N.E.2d 491 (1960).
25. 110 Ohio App. 193, 168 N.E.2d 906 (1959).
26. 170 Ohio St. 113, 162 N.E.2d 849 (1959). See also discussion in Torts section, p. 571
infra.
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been repudiated in Ohio.2" Therefore plaintiff cannot recover on that
theory, since there is no such "cause of action."
Well and good. But is there any theory - any cause of action?
It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the whole field of tort
law in Ohio. But it seems to this writer that the essence of tort liability
is that all torts are made up of a duty owed by defendant to plaintiff, a
breach thereof by defendant, proximate causal connection, and damages
resulting therefrom. The general test of whether there is a cause of
action seems to lie in whether the courts will recognize that to the
plaintiff, in all his circumstances as he sets them forth, there is owed a
duty by defendant. The specific test should come in the determination
of whether this defendant by his particular action or inaction has failed
to perform that duty. If the court can answer "yes" to both questions,
there must be an actionable situation. The plaintiff may fail of proof
upon trial, or the defendant may confess and avoid in one or more ways,
but at least, there is a cause of action in the abstract.
We should, long since, have ceased to pin labels upon causes of
action. The supreme court has recognized this before'8 and recognized
it in its opinion when it said:
Plaintiff contends, however, that she proved a cause of action in
trespass by defendant, and that under our liberal rules of pleading she
can plead under one theory and recover under another, if her proof
so warrants. While it is true that Ohio does not adhere to the strict
rules of pleading required at common law, and that if sufficient facts are
proved a plaintiff may recover even though he has mistakenly chosen
the wrong theory for his action, he must still allege sufficient facts to
establish some cause of action.29 (Emphasis added.)
The court then went on to say that plaintiff's reliance, on appeal,
on a theory of trespass, was equally fruitless, since her petition negatived
any trespass or encroachment by defendant. All this is true, and perhaps
the court was in the position of trying to field weak grounders hit to it
by the plaintiff. At the common law, if plaintiff had had to choose a
form of action, her facts would almost indubitably have called for tres-
pass on the case. To this writer, if there was any duty owed by defend-
ant to plaintiff, it lay in an obligation upon the former to foresee that his
violation of the ordinances of the City of Cleveland could very likely
present a situation which would appeal to the neighborhood's junior
Tarzans, and that their emulative exploits would sooner or later place
them on plaintiff's skylights, to plaintiff's ultimate damage.
The court devoted a good portion of its opinion to an explanation
27. Id. at 115, 162 NE.2d at 851, citing Wheeling & L. E. Ry. v. Harvey, 77 Ohio St.
235, 83 N.E. 66 (1907).
28. Baccelieri v. Heath, 158 Ohio St. 481, 110 NB.2d 130 (1953).
29. Morgenstern v. Austin, 170 Ohio St. 113, 115, 162 N.E.2d 849, 851 (1959).
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to plaintiff that she should have asked leave under section 2309.58 of
the Revised Code to amend her pleading to conform to the evidence.
She did not do so, and since this right to amend is, like God, helpful to
those who help themselves, it availed her nothing here.
This writer in all due respect suggests that the court is in danger
of falling into its own trap. If the facts do not amount to a trespass,
as the word is used in its common-law sense, then a request to amend
to call her action one in trespass could not and should not save her case
for her. She should have amended her "label" to "trespass on the case,"
or, better yet, some modern phraseology which would have expressed
what it was that defendant did or did not do, or what it was that he
knew or should in the exercise of due care have known would happen
to plaintiff's building if he erected his shed where and in the manner
in which he did.
In summary, then, the labels seem unimportant, as do the "theories."
If plaintiff's petition was defective because it lacked allegations of facts
sufficient to show a duty and a breach thereof, or if plaintiff's evidence
fell short of proving such necessary items, then the court is correct in
holding for defendant. If on the other hand, the allegations are suffi-
cient, and they were proved, or were proved without timely objection by
defendant even though not set forth in the pleadings, then the court
seems to have erred. What is in this writer's opinion not important is
the label which anyone puts on them.
The case of New York Central Railroad v. Linamen, ° which appears
in the same volume of reports, sets forth more dearly what this writer is
trying to say. Plaintiff had been compelled to pay to one of its em-
ployees a substantial sum of money as a result of injury sustained by
him while in the course of his employment. The injury had occurred
because defendant had caused a board to extend from premises upon
which he was working, out over plaintiff's track. The "trespass" was
not authorized by plaintiff and it had dearly been the cause of the injury
to plaintiff's employee.
The plaintiff in its petition had characterized the defendant's act as
a "trespass" and, when at the conclusion of plaintiff's presentation of its
case the defendant moved for a directed verdict, on the ground that the
injury was consequential and not direct, the trial court had granted the
motion.
Here was common-law formalism with a vengeance, and the court
of appeals recognized it as such. Of course, the defendant's act was not
a "trespass" and, when at the conclusion of plaintiff's presentation of its
were, the injury in this instance was consequential rather than direct.
30. 162 N.E.2d 900 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959), reversed on other grounds, 171 Ohio St. 87,
167 N.E.2d 778 (1960).
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At common law the form of action would have had to be case. The
act is probably best described as an "encroachment."
In its opinion the court put the whole problem succinctly as follows:
Now, if the plaintiff sets forth the facts of his case and upon those
facts is entitled to a recovery, it matters not whether the wrong be con-
sidered a trespass or an act of negligence ...
It is our conclusion that the petition stated sufficient facts which were
supported by the evidence to establish a prima facie case. It alleged
and offered proof [sic] that the defendant contractor got over the
plaintiff's property line and erected a batter board; that he had no right
to do so, and that the batter board caused the plaintiff the conse-
quential damages, which are the subject of any action which had been
commenced L31
In Rogers v. Barbera3 2 the plaintiff complained against the defendant
for having accused the plaintiff of an armed robbery on premises occupied
by defendant and having caused plaintiff to be imprisoned in the county
jail for more than two months, until released when the grand jury failed
to indict plaintiff.
The gist of plaintiff's petition is set forth in the court's opinion and
is too long to repeat here. From reading it, it is difficult to tell whether
the drafter felt that he had a cause of action in false arrest or malicious
prosecution, although the facts available to him should have told him
that if he had anything at all it must be the latter.
The trial court upon motion, correctly took from the jury's considera-
tion any theory of false arrest (or imprisonment; they are the same thing,
to all intents and purposes' ) but allowed the case to go to the jury on
a question of malicious prosecution. The jury found for plaintiff.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The
supreme court reversed and entered final judgment for defendant on the
ground that the record as a matter of law showed no lack of probable
cause for the acts of defendant.
For the pleader the case is significant in two respects: (1) in its
reaffirmance of the substantive and pleading identity of the actions of
false arrest and false imprisonment, and (2) its recognition that it is not
labels, but facts, which are important in pleading and in substance.3 4
SERVICE OF PROCESS
Mention was made before in this section 5 of the annual survey of the
necessity for the institution of proper service of process in order to ac-
31. Id. at 902.
32. 170 Ohio St. 241, 164 N.E.2d 162 (1960).
33. See Sonenfield, Civil Procedure, Survey of Ohio Law - 1956, 8 WEsT REs. L. Ruv.
254, 263 (1957).
34. For those who are interested in the finer points of "form" in pleading, there is recom-
mended a delightful article, McCaskill, The Modern Philosophy of Pleading, 38 A.BA.J. 123
(1952).
35. Notes 21 & 22 supra, and accompanying text.
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complish a tolling of the statute of limitations. Several other decisions
were published during the period covered by this survey which dealt with
service of process.
In 19536 the legislature amended section 2109.03 of the Revised
Code, adding to the previously existing requirement that a fiduciary of an
estate shall file in the probate court the name of the attorney, if any, who
will represent him in matters relating to his trust, the provision that if
the fiduciary is absent from the state, such attorney shall be the agent
of the fiduciary upon whom summonses, citations and notices may be
served.
In Meisner v. Flemion3 7 the question for decision was whether such
a designated attorney could also be served with process in an action
brought in the common pleas court. Defendant contended that the
statute's applicability was limited to matters or actions in the probate
court. The court of appeals refused to so limit the scope of the amend-
ment and allowed service on the attorney in an action commenced in
common pleas.
In Kaczenski v. Kaczenski 8 an attempt was made to use the same
statute. The fiduciary was a non-resident of Ohio and had appointed a
resident attorney. The plaintiff presented a claim to the fiduciary; it
was rejected and he sued upon it in the common pleas court, resorting to
service on the local attorney. The caption of his petition showed the
defendant fiduciary's address to be outside of Ohio, but in the body of the
petition there was no allegation as to the absence of the fiduciary.
The Court of Appeals for Trumbull County ruled that service on
the attorney was ineffective, for the reason that "the special statute provid-
ing for service upon the agent of the fiduciary requires the one seeking
the service of summons affirmatively to allege in the body of the petition
that the fiduciary is absent from the state."39
Judge Donahue dissented. He could find nothing in the statute
which explicitly or impliedly required such a spelling out of the plaintiff's
problem. Neither can this reviewer. It is not required when a plaintiff




36. 119 Ohio Laws 394, 398 (1953).
37. 109 Ohio App. 117, 164 N.E.2d 183 (1958). See also discussion in lVils and De-
cedents' Estates section, p. 585 infra.
38. 169 N.E.2d 36 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
39. Id. at 37.
40. Blackwell v. Columbus & So. Ohio Elec. Co., 113 N.E.2d 676 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951).
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